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Draft Recommendation
on WEU's operational role
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the contmuing efforts of the Councrl to funher develop and reinforce WEU's
operatronal capabi lity and effectiveness ;
(ii) Au'are that rvrth the completion of the WEU Cnsex 95-96 exercrse. all three levels of WEU's
crlsls-management doctnne have now been tested in a combined crisrs-management, command-post and
live exercrse.
(iu) Assumrng that WEU rvill take due account wrthout delal'of the consequences of the main lessons
Iearnt from the exercise;
(t, Welcomrng the fact that rn rmplementmg the decrsions taken b1' the Councrl rn Birmingham and
Ostend, the Planning Cell has norv developed a coherent and progressive five-1'ear WEU exercrsc
prograrnme which is designed to rmprove WEU's abrlity'to perform Petersberg tasks and rvhich also
includes exercises for WEU-led operations using CJTF;
(v) Welcomrng the progress made in both NATO and WEU rn implementing the CJTF concept.
(vi) Satisfied with the quantrtative and qualitative improvement in working relattons bctu'een NATO
and WEU, which rs cssential for the raprd development of a European secuntl' and dcfence identrtl'
(ESDI) wrthin NATO, as decrdcd rn June 1996.
(vu) Regretting that thc reform of NATO's command structure, a vital clcmcnt in the dcvelopment of
an ESDI and therefore a preconditron for further implementatron of the CJTF concept, has not yet been
completed.
(wt) Emphaslsmg that a number of European countnes constder that in due course - depending on
future Unrted States and European contributions to the southern reglon - the situation lvill be such that
asslgrung the AFSOUTH command to a European will be a natural development;
(t9 Noting that the Council has only replied in part to Assembly Recommendation 597 on a European
intelligence pohcv,
(x) Stressing again the vrtal importance of WEU intelligence on which the Council must rely rvhen
assuming responsibrlitl,for deploving FAWEU in any operatron it may decide to conduct.
(xi) Considering that more flexibrlrty is needed in the mandates of the Plannrng Cell and the
Intelligence Section in order to enable the latter to provide assessments on potentral regtonal criscs or
conflicts which may not have fully been brought to the attention of the Council and therefore mav not
have led to a formal Council request for them to be morutored and assessed;
(nr) Disappointed that no consensus could be found in WEU to do more in the field of humanitarian
actron in the crisis in the Great Lakes regron, for rvhich it would have had both the capabilitres and the
equrpment available rf the WEU countries had had the necessary' courage and political will;
(nu) Looktng forward to fresh initiatives for establishing cooperation betrveen WEU and the
Organisation for Afrrcan Unrty (OAU) on possible support for peacekeeping operations in Africa
conducted by the latter organisation;
(nv) Regretting that WEU as such is not involved in any,wa)' rn the 6 000-strong multinational force
consrstrng solely of uruts from WEU countries and w'hich is implementing a Petersberg-type
humanitarian mrssion in Albarua;
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(*) Noting that the alternative of deployrng a multinational advisory police element, as decrded by the
Council, could suggest that WEU is a police organisation, whereas this activrty rs by no means WEU's
main area of responsibilrty,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COLNCIL
l. Ask each WEU member state to second a correspondent from its national intelligence system to
the Plaruung Cell rn order to improve its capabilities in making up-to-date assessments and analyses of
the situation in potentral Petersberg-task theatres ofoperation:
2. Allow the Intelligence Section, without havrng been so instructed, to monitor regions where crises
or conflicts may be developrng and provide the relevant assessments so that an early warning in such
cases may provide the precious time needed for swift action to prevent crises deteriorating,
3. Take fresh initiatives for establishing cooperation between WEU and the Organisation for
African Unrty (OAU) on possible support for peacekeeping operations in Afrrca conducted by the latter
organisatron,
4. Avoid creatmg the imprcssion that WEU's role is confined to the deplol,rnent of police misstons;
5. Ensure that WEU plays its natural role in Petersberg-type mrssions with clearly specified tasks
and rules of engagement rather than leaving all militarv operations to coalrtrons of the willing among the
WEU countries, without the Organrsation as such berng involved;
6 Pay particular attention to the need for the Parhamentary Assembly to be kept fully informed of
all its decrsrons and follou-up developments as well as of an1' provisions made for the dispatch of
personnel to areas ofcnsrs.
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Explanatory Memoran du m
(submitted by Mr Urbain, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. Whenever the possibility of WEU opera-
tions have been mentioned in security discussions
or cnsis srtuations, cntics have tended to fob it
off with the dreary commonplace that WEU has
no mrlrtary forces and no operational capabilities.
2. France's President struck the right note
when, addressing an audience in June 1996, he
said it was necessary to "put an end to what is
seen in the lvorld as Europe's current incapacity
to take on polrtrco-military actron of any scale
under its own responsibilrty" and, as a conse-
quence, Europe should endeavour to achieve "a
better drvisron of responsrbilrties between the
United States and Europe"r.
3. In fact, for those Europeans who are pre-
pared to hsten to their transatlantic allies, the
United States is sending out unambiguous signals
regarding Europe's obligation to assume more
responsibrlity for its security and defence.
4. The US Permanent Representative to
NATO declared in July 19962 that the develop-
ment of a European security and defence identity
was not up to NATO alone and that WEU itself
also had to be ready, willing and able to act be-
cause the Unrted States could not be more com-
mitted to WEU than its member states.
5. In recent years, the WEU member states,
conscious of such comments on both sides of the
Atlantic, have made serious efforts to overcome
these shortcomings.
6. A report by Mr Dreter Schloten3 described
the state of affairs regarding WEU's operational
capabrlrtres in earll' 1996. Since then, both the
Belgian and French presidencies of WEU have
t Address to the Insfitut des hautes etudes de
ddfense nahonale on 8 June 1996.
2 Atlanhc h'ews,26 July 1996.
3 Document 1518, The operational organisation of
WEU 
- 
reply to the forty-first annual report of the
Council, report submitted on behalf of the Defence
Commrttee by Mr Schloten, Rapporteur .
made considerable efforts to further develop and
reinforce these capabilities
7. When addressing members of the WEU
Assembly on 3 December 1996, the French For-
eign Minister, Herv6 de Charette, emphasised
that:
"WEU is essential for turning Europe into
a power that is capable of playing a full
part wthin the new strategic context.
WEU must genuinely become the Euro-
pean pillar of the Alliance and the defence
component of the Union. This means that
WEU occupres a prvotal position between
the Alliance and the Union; it has to derive
its full operational dimension from the
former and its political legitimacy as the
military branch of the European Union
from the latter."
8. In thrs perspectrve, one of the priorities of
the French Presidency of WEU during the first
half of 1997 has been to develop WEU's opera-
tional capabilities.
9. In January 1997,the WEU Politico-Mili-
tary Group was asked to study the notion of
"pilot-natron" dunng operatlons for which WEU
will not have recourse to NATO assets. The ba-
sic prrncrple should be that in such cases WEU
rvould base its actlons on the capabilities of one
or more member states prepared to make an extra
effort in such an operatron. The Politico-Mili-
tarl' Group rvas also asked to exalnlne the legal
aspects of the lomt use of multinational forces
and to define a new mandate for the WEU Plan-
ning Cell.
10. The French Presrdency also intended to
work out a defimtion of a WEU policy for mili-
tary exercrses, rn partrcular a timeframe which
should cover both autonomous WEU exercises
such as Crisex as rvell as those conducted to-
gether with NATO.
l l. Decrsions would be taken m order to adopt
an "emplolment concept" for the Torrej6n Sat-
ellite Centre rn'hich would transform it into an
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operational strategic monitoring tool for the
benefit of WEU. Recommendations would be
made to the WEU Secretary-General on the oper-
ation of WEU headquarters in a crisis and,
finally, a paper was to be presented on the har-
monisation of cnsrs-management procedures.
12. The purpose of the present report is to give
an account of the latest developments in WEU's
operational capabilrties, including those in the
wrder framework of cooperation with NATO,
which is being restructured to face new realities,
one of which rs the development of a European
security and defence rdentrty rvithin that organi-
sation.
II. I|/EU exercise policy
13. In order to prepare WEU for the imple-
mentation of Petersberg missions, early efforts
concentrated on the exercrse "WEU Crisex 95-
96" u'hich was designed to test WEU's crisrs-
management instruments from the plannrng of a
WEU operation through to its implementatron in
a specific crisis area WEU implemented this
exercise in three phases. The general framework
for the exercise was a peacekeeping operation in
accordance with Chapter VI of the United
Nations Charter.
14. It should be noted that Crisex did not in-
clude any element of the CJTF concept which
was only in the early stages of negotiation by the
time planning for Crisex had been completed.
15. Phase I, which took place from 15 to 2l
December 1995, concerned decision-making and
procedural mechanisms withrn WEU and be-
tween WEU headquarters and the capitals. One
of the lessons learnt from thrs exercise was that
WEU communications were madequate for crisis
management and that there were shortcommgs on
the logistics side. As a result, a new communi-
cations nehvork betrveen WEU headquarters and
the capitals is now gradually being established.
16. Phase II, which took place in June 1996,
tested cooperation between WEU decision-mak-
rng bodies, capitals and an operational headquar-
ters in France. It rncluded the creation of an op-
erational staff headquarters and the deployment
of a peacekeepmg force to ensure a secure envi-
ronment for the delivery of humanrtarian aid to a
fictitious country.
17 . In December 1996, Phase III tested coop-
eration between operational headquarters and
field headquarters. It focused WEU's missrons
on strategic and operational levels and in particu-
lar on WEU forces projection. The objective was
to implement operatronal mechanisms durrng
management of a srmulated crisis. This last
phase of Crisex 95-96 took place from 12 to 17
December 1996. It comprised the establishment
of a multinational headquarters for the particrpat-
rng forces and the deployment of an advanced
element in Lanzarote (Canary Islands) which was
the theatre ofoperatrons. The deployrnent ofthis
advanced element by means of a genuine multi-
national airlift was planned by the newly-created
WEU mobility working group under the chair-
manship of a member of the Planning Cell.
18. The hard core of the headquarters was
composed of elements from the five countries
participating in the European Corps, rvhile ele-
ments from the other five full WEU member
states were also incorporated. Countries that are
not full members of WEU participated as ob-
servers.
19. Phase III of Crisex saw t}re establishment
for the first time of a secure video-conference
link between WEU headquarters in Brussels and
the operations commander and his headquarters.
20. Meanwhile, as mentioned in the Schloten
report, it had increasingly been felt that these
new Petersberg tasks should be practised using
different formations in field exercrses.
21. Under the United Kingdom's Presidencl, rn
the first half of 1996, serious work was done to
create the basis for an exerclse programme
tailored to WEU requrrements. As a result, the
WEU Council of Ministers said in its Birming-
ham Declaration of 7 May 1996 that an agree-
ment had been reached on measures to implement
WEU exercrse policy more effectively, including
the establishment of an annual WEU exercise
planning conference u,hich would set out a co-
herent and progressive exercise prograrnme.
22. In the same Declaration, Ministers
"welcomed the decrsrons of the United Kingdom
Government to make its operational sea training
facilities available to WEU for national or col-
lective use by WEU nations. Mrnisters noted
that shared use of these types of facrlitres could
improve military cooperation among WEU
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nations and invited other WEU natlons to make
srmilar offers, takrng into account the work on
multinational task-sharrng".
23 They asked the Permanent Counctl "to
consider how to extend the initiative of opera-
tional sea training so that WEU can make opti-
mum use of similar offers in a wider range of
military facilities".
24. During the Belgian Presidency, efforts
continued to establish a coordinated WEU exer-
cise programme and in their Ostend Declaration
of 19 November 1996, Ministers "welcomed the
of[ers and requests received from WEU nattons
relating to the wider use of national training
facilities and capabilities, with a view to WEU
deriving optrmum benefit from these offers, tak-
ing into account Eurolongterm's work on multi-
national task-sharing". They noted that "this
networking of WEU countries' training assets
will enable each participant, havrng due regard to
specific national characteristics, to benefit from
the ensuing synergies". Encouraged by these
responses, Ministers "asked the Permanent
Councrl to ensure that a database of offers and
requests is maintained"
25. After the initial replies of WEU member
states regardrng both offers and requests, the
Planning Cell issued a complementary list of
questions for more detailed specificatton. The
Planning Cell has now made a first full catalogue
of offers and requests. This catalogue wrll be
distributed annually, wrth a half-yearly update.
26 The Plannrng Cell has a coordrnating role
in that it wrll establish contacts between the
country which has made a request and the coun-
try which has made a corresponding offer. The
practrcal arrangements for the actual use wrll
have to be agreed in bilateral negotiations.
27. Military training is seen to be a national
responsibility. Each country will designate a
national point of contact with responsibility for
the national training facilities which have been
offered to other WEU countries. This national
point of contact will, on a bilateral basis, also
handle requests for deployrnent and conditions
for use.
28. The objective of current WEU exercise
policy is to define policy for (a) training head-
quarters staff and the forces that could be made
available to WEU and (b) putting mto operatton
the procedures and entrties envisaged for the de-
cision-making process.
29. From the outset, it rvas decrded that WEU
exercises should be planned on the basis of exer-
cises organised by member states.
30 The Planning Cell has now developed a
coherent and progressive five-year exercise pro-
gramme which is to be revised vearl1,. The word
"progressive" is meant to indrcate that each new
exercise should take account ofthe lessons learnt
from the preceding one.
3 l. It was agreed that a coherent exercise pro-
gramme should
contnbute to the development of
WEU's global capacity to conduct
Petersberg operations:
- 
exploit in the best possible way the
limited resources and infrastructures
allocated to exercises in WEU member
states;
improve operational interoperability
between the forces;
- 
lmprove coordination between the ex-
ercise prograrnmes of WEU and
NATO, including those of the Partner-
ship for Peace
32 Only' a five-year programme will enable
WEU to avord duplications and incompatibilities
with multinational or NATO-PfP exercises and
at the same time enable its member states to plan
their participatron.
33 It is thought that in the future, joint
WEU/NATO exercrses should take place, in
particular to vahdate the various elements of the
CJTF concept.
34. An annual WEU conference, chaired by
the Planning Cell, rvrll be devoted to exercise
planning, u'hich should also take place in close
cooperation u'ith NATO. Such conferences
should in particular:
- 
define the operational objectives of the
exercise programme.
- 
define and revise the WEU exercise
prograrnme w'hich should enable it to
attain those objectives;
specrS the resources which will be
made avarlable b1' the particrpating
countries;
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define exactlv the participation of
countries in drfferent exercises;
- 
define exactly WEU participatron in
exercises being proposed by countries
or groups of countnes in order to test
certain capacrtics.
prepare a substantial contribution for
the NATO Exercise Conference.
35. In the framework of implementing WEU
exerclse pohcv, it was decided to extend the
mandate of the Plannrng Cell and to ask it to:
propose oblectives for WEU exercises
(which will have to be approved b1'the
Planning Conference);
- 
organise the Planning Conference and
provrde rt wrth support;
coordmate WEU's requirements u'ith
exercise prograrxnes existing in indi-
vidual countnes, the multinational
FAWEU and NATO;
coordmate offers from the WEU coun-
tries to make resources avarlable (in
particular for logistics support and
planning),
- 
coordmate offers concerning the par-
ticipation of forces;
submit to the Councrl for approval the
results of the Plannrng Conference,
once the countries have given their
agreement, and in partrcular the objec-
tives set for WEU exerclses and the ex-
erclse programme;
present WEU's contribution to the
NATO Exercise Conference.
36. It should be remembered that in the origi-
nal terms of reference for the Planning Cell, the
mandate given to the Operations and Exercises
Sectron was to set forth and promote WEU ex-
ercise requrrements and take responsibility for
coordinating plans and timetables for multina-
tional exerclses, to enable the Organisation to
deal with any cnses.
37. The Plannrng Cell has now developed
WEU exercise oblectives and programmes for the
period 1997-2001 The 1997-98 exercises have
been firmly agreed, while the programme for
1999-2001 is still up for revrew For the 1997-
98 exercises rt has defined the follorving objec-
tives:
- 
test the WEU crisis-management
documents, procedures and arrange-
ments includrng the consultation mech-
anisms between WEU and the capitals;
promote cooperation with observer and
partner countnes,
- 
cooperate with other multinational and
supranational organisations ;
- 
provrde procedural training for WEU
permanent bodies and WEU staffs;
implement generic plans, develop con-
tingency plans and draft a Directive to
the Operations Commander,
test the process of providing WEU
with rntelligence;
provide inputs for the plannrng of
future WEU exercises.
38. It should be emphasised, as noted in para-
graph 31, that the troops, resources and infra-
structures which WEU member states are
allocating to exercrses are limited. The WEU
exercise programme is therefore nghtly concen-
trated on those issues which are of particular
rnterest for possible WEU operations. Crisex-
like exercrses and exercises to test the use of
NATO assets in a WEUJed operation, together
rvrth the other objectives mentioned in paragraph
37. such as testing the process of providing WEU
with intelligence must indeed be the pnorities
over the coming years.
39. The first WEU exercise conference in
March 1997 was attended by all 28 WEU coun-
tnes and the results were approved by the Per-
manent Council.
40. NATO is particularly involved rn devising
a prograrnme to test command structures. The
important activitres in this programme wrll be:
- 
a joint crisis-management excrcrse in
1999 in rvhich a first test wrll take
place with WEU asking to be provided
with NATO assets;
a command post exercrse rn'ith NATO
rn 2000 in which the concept of NATO
making command structures available
for a WEU-led operation wrll be tested.
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4l Obvrously, these exercises can only take
place after the first CJTF headquarters trials in
NATO, which are scheduled for 1997 and 1998
III. Combined joint task forces (CJTF) and
the reform of NATO's command structures
42. At the NATO summit meeting in Brussels
on I0-11 January 1994, important decisrons rvere
taken as regards the adaptatron of NATO's
military structures and procedures with a view to
accommodating the enlarged spectrum of
Alliance missions. This summit also endorsed
the concept of combined loint task forces (CJTF)
to make Allied assets available to Europeans for
conducting military operations in which the
United States did not participate.
43. Implementing these far-reaching decrsions
was sholm to be no easy task, although all those
concerned made the greatest possible effiorts to
provide early results.
44. A milestone was reached with the North
Atlantic Council's meeting rn Berlin on 3 June
1996 whrch confirmed the 1994 decisions and
took note of the progress made since January
1994 At this meeting rt was also decided to dev-
elop the European secunty and defence rdentity'
withrn the Alliance.
45. It has been noted earlier that all the
abovementioned decisrons are hugely rmportant
for the development of WEU's operational cap-
abilities A report prepared by Mr Marten for
the December 1996 session of the Assemblya,
gave a detailed account of the progress made m
the implementation of these decrsions up to
November 1996. Since then, further steady
progress has been made but apparently the
reform of NATO's command structures is the
most difficult hurdle.
46. NATO has now developed a CJTF head-
quarters doctrine which includes the following
features:
- 
a suitable ad hoc CJTF headquarters
will be built up around a multinational,
joint "nucleus" selected from a range of
such permanently available "nuclei,
embedded, mostly with dual-hatted per-
o Document 1545, Defence and security rn an
enlarged Europe 
- 
reply to the annual report of the
Council, report submitted on behalf of the Defence
Committee by Mr Marten, Rapporteur
sonnel, m parent headquarters of the
current, and future, military structure
of the Alliance";
- 
these nucler wrll provide the core of the
"key" staff functrons of a CJTF head-
quarters and will be complemented by
the required additional personnel and
additional staff capabrlitres as needed:
such "augmentatron modules" will be
drawn from other parent NATO head-
quarters, or from other appropnate
multrnatronal headquarters or national
sources;
a fully-fledged CJTF headquarters will
furthermore require the addition of
"support modules", that is, specialised
support units and elements of a various
nature; they will be drawn from the
same sources as the "augmentation
modules";
each nucleus will be tasked with the
preparation of its burld-up. In additron,
centralised CJTF headquarters plan-
nrng wrll be conducted in a "Combined
Jornt Plannrng Staff' at the maJor
NATO commander level. A "Cap-
abrlitres Coordmatron Cell" wrll assist
the Military Committee in providing
plaruring gurdance to the major NATO
commanders and related advice to the
North Atlantic Council.
Completed in this w&y, CJTF headquarters
would then be able to take control of the units
selected to make up the task force and to deploy
them in the theatre of operations.5
47. Due to the many requirements which the
CJTF concept must satisfl', implementing the
concept wrll take time. Clearly, makrng recom-
mendations on the location, size, number and
structure of CJTF headquarters elements and
their modus operandt will require an evolution-
ary, trial-by-error approach. The NATO mili-
tary authorities envisagc three phases. In a first
s NATO's CJTF headquarters doctrine as explained
by Mr Marc Bentinck, Defence Planning and Policy
Division, NATO, at the joint seminar held by the
WEU Institute for Security Studies and the Royal
United Services Institute for Defence Studres on
"CJTFs 
- 
a lifehne for a European defence policy",
Paris. 2l-22 April 1997.
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phase, the inrtral establishment of parent head-
quarters will allow the major NATO command-
ers to corrrmence CJTF headquarters trrals and
exerclses and thus create the basis for an initial
Alliance capability that wrll deploy CJTF head-
quarters. The first CJTF headquarters trials are
scheduled for late 1997 and early 1998. To that
end, three initial headquarters nucler have been
set up: STRIKFLTLANT rn Norfolk, Virginia,
with the command ship USS "Mount Whitnev"
for sea-supported CJTF operations, and
AFCENT in Brunssum and AFSOUTH in
Naples for land-supported CJTF operations. The
second phase r.r'ill be devoted to a thorough as-
sessment of the Alliance's capability' to deploy
small- and large-scale land and sea-based CJTF
headquarters This assessment could, for
instance, result m the designation of additional
CJTF parent headquarters. The third and last
phase should see the CJTF concept being fully
implemented By that time it rvill have to be
adapted to the new NATO command structure
48. It has been noted that the Implementation
Force (IFOR) and its successor Stabilisatron
Force (SFOR) in Bosnra and Herzegovina has
many elements in common rvith a CJTF Les-
sons learnt in the deplol,rnent of these forces will
therefore play an important role m the further
development of the CJTF concept One element
of NATO's overall CJTF concept is to offer the
possibility of WEUJed CJTF operations rvhich
in their turn are an expression of the development
of an ESDI wrthm the Alliance.
49. The development of an ESDI requires the
elaboratron of European command arrange-ments
within NATO u.htch u'ill enable operations to be
prepared, commanded and conducted under the
political control and strategrc directron of WEU.
In this field, much work rcmarns to be done on
many specific and detailcd questions, not least
because 
- 
understandably 
- 
it is the view m
NATO that the consequences of ESDI develop-
ment should not endanger the transatlantrc part-
nershrp or NATO's integrated mrlitary structure.
50. At the moment, work rn progress mcludes
the following main issues:
rulitary plannrng and exercises for the
rlhrstratrye mtsstons dennfied by
WEU
In August 1996, the WEU Planning Cell
developed from rts exrsting generic plans
about twenf'''illustratrve profiles" with an
evaluation in each as to whether NATO
assets and capabrlrtres mrght or mrght not
be required. The Permanent Councrl then
selected stx profiles determining whether
or not NATO assets and capabilrtres might
be required and prcsented them to NATO
for further consrderatron. Out of the six,
NATO selected two uhich could be
dubbed the most extensive and the most
restricted profile 
- 
a divrsron and a bri-
gade-size operation respectively The
Planning Ccll rs now provrdrng assistance
to NATO's Combined Joint Planning Staff
for further detailed work on these profiles;
terms of reference and method of
appomtment of Deputy SACEUR wrth
a vtew to hs ESDI role
At rts meeting on 22 Aprrl 1997, NATO's
Military Committee approved the terms of
reference for the responsibilittes of the
Deputl' SACEUR in hrs ESDI role and the
arrangements concernlng the chain of com-
mand for a WEU-led operatlon with
CJTF,
- 
NATO/WEU mformatron-shanng ar-
rangements for WEU-led operatrons
In this framework, it is recalled that on 6
May 1996 a secunty agreemcnt was con-
cluded betvveen NATO and WEU u,hich
concentrates on the sharing of documents
between both organisations and the recrp-
rocal use of operational capabrlities. In
particular, the agreement includes proce-
dures for protectrng and safeguarding clas-
srfied information and material exchanged
by them.
The conclusron of the secunty agreement
can be considered an rmportant step for-
rvard m cooperation between NATO and
WEU, not least because it rvill facrlitate
the use of NATO assets b1' WEU for the
implementation of Petersberg missrons,
based on the agreed princrples of comple-
mentarity and transparency.
It envisages facilitating the transmission of
NATO intelligence to WEU, both between
the secretariats of each organisation and
between SFIAPE and the WEU Planning
Cell. It defines the condrtions for the
transmission or exchange of documents
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and estabhshes rules for the protection of
classified documents, rvith each of the par-
ties establishing minimum secuntl' stan-
dards for information exchanged.
The secuntv agreement also provides
WEU wrth easler access to confidential
NATO documents concerrung intra-Alh-
ance procedures, secret communtcation
codes and military intelhgence
The first formal release of NATO
documents to the Planning Cell was agreed
b1'NATO's Military Committee in Sep-
tember 1996, and the first such release to
NATO's International Military Staff, u'as
agreed by the WEU Permanent Counctl m
October 1996. The agreement wrll make it
easier for both organrsations to implement
their respectrve missions and adapt therr
military structures while contributing to
the development of the European secuntv
and defence identity x'rthm NATO and
facilrtating the deplolment of CJTF.
Finally', it should be noted that as a result
of the conclusion of this secunty agree-
ment, the earlier Memorandum of Under-
standing between NATO and WEU on a
communications netu'ork is taking effect.
WEU is now connected to NATO's secure
and rnsecure volce and data networks.
Connections became operational in Dec-
ember 1996, just pnor to Phase III of the
Crisex exerciie.
In the wake of the NATO-WEU security
agreement, WEU is no$' signing security
agreements with observer states and asso-
ciate partners in order to facilitate internal
communicatlons at WEU and its coopera-
tion wrth NATO. Such agreements have
now been srgned u'ith Austna, Sweden,
Finland and some assoclate partners.
Agreements with Ireland and the other
assocrate partners are being prepared.
arrangements for the release, mon-
fioring and return of the assets and
capabilrfies made available to WEU
support from NATO's defence-plan-
rung process for the conduct of WEU-
led operafions
The Plannrng Section of WEU's Plannrng
Cell is norv rvorking urth NATO in order
to examrne how WEU requirements can
play a role in the adaptation and refine-
ment of NATO's defence-planning process
for non-Article five tasks at the hrgher end
of the spectrum of Petersberg tasks
the development of procedures for
NATO-WEU consultafions m the con-
text of a WEUJed operatrcn wrth
NATO support
The problem of how to involve associate
members in the procedure for coordinatton
betu'een WEU and NATO for a WEU-led
CJTF operation norv has been solved. It
will be remembered that at the Ostend
meetmg of the WEU Councrl of Mmtsters,
Turkey had asked to be involved in pre-
paratory u'ork and the conduct of WEU
operations requirrng NATO assets. This
request had met with opposition from
Greece which had argued that the status of
associate member did not allorv for m-
volvement in the planning and conduct of
operations at such an early' stage. Rec-
entlr', a solution has been found to this
problem rn WEU through an unambrguous
rnterpretation of the associate member
status u'hich is satisfactory to all those m-
volved. It has norv been agreed that those
NATO member states r,r'hrch are associate
members of WEU 
- 
Turkel', Iceland and
Noru'a1'- or WEU observers 
- 
Denmark
- 
will be able to participate fully in WEU
decrsrons concerning missions requrring
the use of NATO infrastructures.
51. It should be noted that with a fully-devel-
oped ESDI u'ithrn NATO, the structures of the
Alliance rn the future will have to be able to
function in an Atlantic or, alternatively, Euro-
pean configuration. NATO authorities are there-
fore particularly keen to develop structures and
procedures which, in the face of an emerging
crisrs, wrll allorv a swrtch from one configuration
to the other in a timelv, flexible and dccisive
manner.
52. As regards the restructuring of NATO's
command structure, which is closely'linked to the
CJTF concept and the development of the Euro-
pean security' and defence identity, NATO's
Military Committee, meeting on 22 Apri 1997,
came down strongly in favour of a reductton
from four to three command levels and a reduc-
tion from 65 to 20 headquarters At the strategrc
level, both the Atlantic (ACLANT) and Euro-
l0
DOCUMENT 1567
pean headquarters will be maintained ACLANT
will have three regional commands and two
functional headquarters: Strike Fleet Atlantic for
surface operations and SUBACLANT for sub-
manne activities (there will not be a thrrd level of
command for ACLANT). In Europe, there
would be only two regional headquarters, North
(the present AFCENT) with two component
commands for the air and naval forces and three
subregronal headquarters, and South (the present
AFSOU-IH) The number and distribution of the
southern subregional headquarters is strll the
subject of drscussron. One of the reasons rs that
differences contrnue to exst over a Spanish claim
to a subregronal headquarters and the associated
request for a transfer of the Canary Islands to the
European command area. The distnbutron of the
subregional headquarters between Greece and
Turkey is also a problem. A rotation of com-
mand between Greece and Turkey has been pro-
posed as a possible solution.
53. No way has yet been found of settling the
controversy within NATO over the nationality of
the Commander of the Allied Forces South
(AFSOUTH) It rs common knorvledge that
France has made the Europeanisation of NATO a
condition for its reintegration in NATO's mili-
tarl' structures France rvants to achieve a new
mrlrtarl' balance between the United States and
Europe, and share responsibilities on an equal
footing. It wants paritf in the southern region.
France has unambiguousll' asked that the com-
mander of AFSOUTH be a European. This
command could then rotate between different
European member states.
54. It is to be noted that several European
countrres consider that at a given time 
- 
among
other thrngs, depending on future Unrted States
and European contributrons m the southern re-
gion 
- 
the situatron wrll be such that assrgning
the command to a European will become a natu-
ral development.
55. At present, it seems more likely that the
Allies rvill agree on a compromise as advocated
earlier by both Germany and Italy, which would
involve leaving the southern command in the
hands of the United States for the time being and
reconsrdering the issue in five to seven years'
time. In the meantime, Europeans should make
an effort to strengthen therr particrpation rn the
southern command and at the same time suffi-
crently reinforce the presence ofEuropean navies
in the Mediterranean so as to better renegotiate
the existrng arrangements.
56 The French reaction to the drfferent pro-
posals for a compromise on thc AFSOUTH
command is not known at the time of writing this
report (April 1997) Although the forthcoming
French parliamentary elections have introduced a
new element of uncertamty, it is thought that
France, even if it does not obtain full satisfaction
as regards AFSOUTH, rvould not prevent deci-
srons on the Alhance's internal military restruc-
turing being adopted. It is also thought that
France wrll not grve up its enhanced presence in
NATO, m partrcular its partrcipation in the
Milrtary Commrttee and m the North Atlantic
Council m Defence Minister session. France
realises full well that any reversal of its rap-
prochement to NATO which it started m Decem-
ber 1995 rvould be a severe blorv to the further
development of the ESDI rvrthm NATO and
u'ould also hamper progress on the implementa-
tion of CJTF for WEU-led operations Both
these rssues are main axes of France's pohcy on
the development of Europe's operational cap-
abilities, whrch it would certarnly not u'ant to
give up.
IV Forces answerable to WEU (FAWELD
57. The Schloten report6, reviewed the
FAWEU concept and its status. This has now
become a u'ell-estabhshed concept and no major
new developments have taken place since. With
the further rmplementatron of the CJTF concept,
WEU has been provided with even more flexrbrl-
ity since it can now call upon three different
categories of troops, assets and capabrlrties
according to its requirements:
national FAWEU, military unrts and
headquarters designated by states
which can be made available on a case-
by-case basis to carry out tasks con-
ducted under the authority of WEU;
FAWEU have now been designated by
each of thc ten member states, Norway
and Turkcy (associate members), Aus-
tria, Finland and Srveden (observers)
and rune of the ten associate partners,
rvrth Slovcnra 
- 
rvhich recently became
thc tenth associate partner 
- 
now pre-
l1
6 Assembly Document 1518, Chapters M and MI
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paring the desrgnatron of its FAWEU.
Proposals for FAWEU made b1'
Ukraine have not been rncorporated m
the standing hst of FAWEU but they
will be consrdered on a case-by-case
basis;
multinational FAWEU, established
multinational military unrts and head-
quarters, jointly designated for the
same purpose by the participating
states At present the five multina-
tronal FAWEU are the European
Corps, the Multinational Division
Central (with Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom
partrcrpatrng), the Anglo-Dutch Am-
phrbrous Force, Euromarfor and Euro-
for.
58. Euromarfor was created in 1995 Simi-
larly to the European Corps, arrangements have
now been made for Eurofor and Euromarfor to
be made available to NATO for operations which
are not covered by Artrcle 5 of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty.
59. On 9 November 1996, Eurofor, a Euro-
pean multrnatronal force with units from France,
Italy, Portugal and Spain was established in
Florence. Eurofor rvas created mainly to imple-
ment WEU's so-called Petersberg missions but it
can also act m order to rmplement NATO deci-
srons or compl1' with requests from the United
Natrons.
60. The Planmng Cell is working on the 1997
update and has completed its analysis of the
1996 update. It has now embarked upon a pro-
gramme of liaison with the staffs of the potentialjoint operations headquarters proposed by the
various nations and has concluded memoranda of
understanding establishing permanent liaisons
between the Plaruring Cell and each of the five
abovementioned multinational forces.
61 In Birmrnghzrm on 7 May 1996, Luxem-
bourg formally completed the procedures for ac-
cesslon to the European Corps.
62. On I I December, the Chiefs of Staff of
the Luxembourg army and the Belgian land
forces signed the agreement concerning the inte-
gration of the Luxembourg reconnaissance com-
pany of 180 troops, equipped rvith hght
armoured vehrcles, rnto the lst Belgran mecha-
nised division via the 7th Brigade from March-
en-Famenne which is already part of the Euro-
pean Corps.
63. The European Corps norv consists of the
following units:
- 
the lst Belgian Mechanised Drvision;
the Franco-Gennan Brigade;
- 
the lst French Armoured Division;
the lOth German Armoured Division,
- 
the 2lst Spanish Mechanised Infantry
Brigade,
the reconnaissance company from Lux-
embourg.
64 In 1996, the European Corps held its
arurual exercise from l0 to 20 June. A total of
8 500 soldrers, 3 300 vehicles and 20 hehcopters
participated in the exercrse called "Pegasus 96".
The objective was to test the Corp's capabrlity
for joint defence under NATO auspices and, in
particular, to improve the interoperabrlity of the
major units, therr command training and their
ability for rapid projectron of combat forces over
large distances An addrtional objective was to
improve the interoperabilrty of the German and
French information and command systems.
65 It should be noted here that the Com-
mander of the European Corps, the French Gen-
eral, Prerre-Henri Forterre, stated on 9 May 1996
that he was rn favour of this corps being fully
professional in order to make sure that in the
event of a crlsrs it could take part with all its re-
sources. As is known, the German forces are
still subject to a number of restnctrons, due in
part to the fact that it is a conscript army.
66. At the beginning of August 1996, the
United Kingdom announced that it w'ould estab-
lish a joint rapid deployrnent force, to be drawn
from the arrnv, naly, amphibious and air forces
which should be able to react to emergency
situatrons worldwide, conducting missions rang-
ing from the evacuation of civihans to
peacekeeping Since these are typical Petersberg
missions, such a force could make a positive
contributron as a FAWEU.
V. Intelligence Section
67. The Intelhgence Section of the Planning
Cell, which started operatrng in September 1995,
t2
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reached its full strength of 6, including the head
of section, rn autumn 1996 It receives frequent
inputs of intelligence data from a number of
WEU member states, on the basis of which the
Intelligence Section produces a weekly intelli-
gence surrrmary for the members and associate
members of WEU This summary includes
assessments of the reglons rvhich the Planning
Cell monitors and reports on in accordance with
its official remit from the Permanent Councrl. At
present, these regions comprise Albania, the
Great Lakes region rn Africa, former Yugoslavia
and Somalia. If the Intelligence Section consid-
ers that the Permanent Council should be arvare
of other developments on rvhrch it has no
instructions, it can report on these under an1,
other business.
68. It should be noted that at the Planning
Cell, the Intelhgence Sectron's close rvorking
relatrons wrth the Situation Centre and the Sat-
ellite Centre at Torrelon are being deepened. A
formal memorandum of understanding on the
exchange of information between the Intelligence
Sectron and the Srtuatron Centre has been srgned.
69. It will be remembered in this connection
that last year the Assembly of WEU adopted a
Recommendation on a European Intelhgence
Policy (No. 597) in which it recommended that
the Council
"1. Strengthen the hnks between WEU
and NATO with a vierv to sharing the
intelligence required for operational plan-
ning and activities of European armed
forces in the framework of Petersberg
tasks;
2. Ask each WEU member state to sec-
ond a correspondent from its national in-
telligence system to the Planning Cell in
order to improve its capabilities rn makmg
up-to-date assessments and analyses of the
situation in potential Petersberg task-
theatres of operatron. "
70. The Council communicated rts reply to the
Assembly on 27 November 1996, too late to be
taken mto account in the Committee's reports for
the December session, as they had already been
adopted on 12 November
71. As regards the Council's reply to the first
paragraph of the Recommendation, rt seems that
developments since June 1996 have provided full
satisfaction on this issue The signature of the
security agreement between NATO and WEU
and positive cooperation between NATO and
WEU on the implementatlon of the CJTF con-
cept, along the lines ofthe decrsions taken by the
NATO Mrnisterial Council in Berlin in June
1996 and the WEU Councrl of Mimsters in Brr-
mingham and Ostend, have left little doubt about
the progress that has been made on strengthening
the hnks between the two organisatrons and the
exchange of information and intelligence.
72. In the second paragraph of rts reply, how-
ever, the Council reverts to its old rvays. In the
second paragraph of its Recommendatron, the
Assembly had very specifically requested it to
ask each WEU member state to second a corres-
pondent from rts national rntelhgence system to
the Planning Cell. The Councrl, in its reply, lim-
its itself to quoting documents which it adopted
in Madrid in November 1995 and rn Birmingham
in Ma1' 1996 and referring to other generalrtres
without so much as a word on the specrfic pro-
posal made b1,the Assembly.
73 Once again, the Assembly does not ques-
tion the Council's right to criticise or reJect a
proposal but believes it should react to a pro-
posal in clear language and say whether it likes it
or not instead of rgnoring it. The Assembly
would prefer straightforward replies from the
Council rather than empty phrases It makes no
sense for the Council to furn a deaf ear.
74. If the Council really takes the view that
there is no prospect of implementing the proposal
made in the second paragraph of Recommenda-
tion 597, it mal,consider a suggestion which was
made at a seminar organised by the WEU Insti-
tute for Securrty Studies in March 1997, where it
was proposed that the permanent representatrons
at WEU designate points of contact between
national intelligence systems and the Intelligence
Section of the Planning Cell7.
' Frdddric Oberson at the semrnar "Developing a
European intelligence poliry". WEU Institute for
Security Studies, Paris, 13-14 March 1997.
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75 As was sard m the earher Assembll' report
on a European rntclligence pohc1,E. the Intelli-
gence Section should be the startmg pornt for
more WEU autonoml' rn intelhgence, so that the
Council has all the informatron it requrres to
assume responsibrlrty for deployrng FAWEU in
an1'operatron it decidcs to conduct.
76. For missions rn certain cases. it will be
easy for WEU to rell' on planning information
from member states rvhich. for historrcal reasons,
have a thorough knou'ledge of the area.
77. On the other hand, rt is vital that the Intel-
ligence Sectron exchanges informatron u'ith
NATO with a view to possible future WEUJed
operations usrng CJTF In thrs respect, the
securitl'agreement betw'een NATO and WEU is
an important step fonvard becausc rt accommo-
dates agreement on the procedures governing the
classrficailon of confidential documents and their
communication codes rvith a vieu' to adapting
NATO standards for future mrlrtary operations
carried out by' Europeans
78. Apart from thrs, the great importance of
uslng open sources for intelligence gathenng
should once again be emphasrsed.
79. A drawback to the present functioning of
the Intelligence Section is that rt can only provrde
assessments on the regions whrch the Plannrng
Cell monitors and reports on m accordance urth
an officral remrt. More flexibrlrtf in the remit of
the Planning Cell and Intelligence Section lvould
enable the latter to provide assessments on re-
gions u'here cnses or conflrcts mav be developing
and which have not yet come to the notrce of the
medra and the Permanent Council. Early lvarn-
ing may provide the precious time needed for
swift action to prevent crises deterroratmg.
80. A close and direct working relationshrp
between the Intelligence Section and the Satellrte
Centre rn Torrej6n rs consrdered to be essentral
for WEU's intelligence capabilitl,. Although
progress has been made, it seems that therc is
still room for rmprovement rn this field.
' A European intelligence policl', report submltted
on behalf of the Defence Commrttee by Mr Baumel,
Chairman and Rapporteur, Document 1517
W. IVEU initiatives on
African peacekeepinge
81 In the document on "European security, a
common concept of the 27 WEU countries",
adopted by the WEU Councrl at rts meetrng of 14
November 1995 in Madrid, it was said that WEU
was rn the process of studying the possrbrlrty of
supporting initiatrves taken b1'the Afrrcans in the
field of peacekeeprng, notably vra regional and
sub-regional mstrtutrons.
82. Meeting in Lisbon rn May 1995, the
Council instructed the Permanent Council "to
take forward its reflections on peacekeeping and
conflict prevention in Africa", in line with the
EU's request to WEU to drarv up and rmplement
specific measures rvhich could help mobrlise
African capabrlrties in IIN forces.
83. In Birmrngham on 7 May 1996, the Minis-
ters endorsed the Permanent Council's decision
to send a fact-finding mrssion to Afrrca.
84 In the same month, Belgium declared that,
on the basis of its expenence in Somalia and
Rwanda during its presidency of WEU rn the
second half of 1996. it was planning to develop
relations between WEU and the OAU in the
context of peacekeeprng operations u'hrch the
latter carried out in Afrrca.
85 In August 1996, a WEU fact-finding mis-
sion including staff offrcers from the Planning
Cell visrted the seat of the Organisation of Afrr-
can Uniry' (OAU), Ethiopia, Kenya, Tmrzama,
and Malawr.
86. The Permanent Council later decided to
invrte the Secretary-General of the OAU to visit
WEU in Brussels in order to inform the OAU
about WEU's crisis-management procedures,
draw attention to common fields of interest and
specific cooperation possrbrlrties and discuss the
complementarv roles of the EU and WEU in
conflrct prevention and peacekeeping in Africa.
It rvas thought that thc drscussion could also
focus on ways of improving the existing cap-
abilities of the OAU, sub-regional African
e A number ofparagraphs ofthis chapter also appear
in the report on WEU's contnbution to reinforcing
peace in central Africa, submrtted on behalf of the
Defence Committee by Mr Masseret, Rapporteur.
Document 1566.
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organisations and African countries that mrght
contnbute troops for peacekeeprng and of estab-
lishing better contacts between WEU and the
OAU. At present, no such visit has yet taken
place but WEU is continurng to explore
possibilrties for cooperation with the OAU.
87. In that framework, the Permanent Council
considered the possibilitv of mamtaming contacts
with the appropnate technical working groups of
the OAU through the WEU Politico-Military
Group
88. The 28 WEU countries were invited to
examine rvays in rvhich they mrght support the
OAU. sub-regional orgarusatrons or Afncan
countries m the framework of peacekeeping
using various means, such as
putting equipment for communicatrons
or logistical support at the OAU's drs-
posal;
making a contribution to the formatron
and trainrng of troops in Africa or
Europe.
89. The Politrco-Military Group recommended
the Council to give WEU a clcaring-house role,
to be assumed by'thc Planning Cell. The Plan-
nrng Cell should in partrcular be a pomt of con-
tact for the trainrng needs of the OAU, sub-
regional Afncan organisations or Afncan coun-
tries It should identifu regional trarning centres
and keep a record ofany' support needs they may
have.
90 The Planning Cell, rt rvas said, could also
be the point of contact for the material needs of
the OAU, sub-regional African organrsatrons or
Afrrcan countries. Following up decisions taken
by the Ministerial Council at Ostend in Novem-
ber 1996, the Planning Cell has nou'estabhshed
databases for offers of trarning from European
nations to African countries, as rvell as more
general databases on training for humanitarian
landmine clearance operations.
9i. A follow-up observer mission visited the
first combined African peacekeeping field exer-
cise, NANGBETO 97, in March 1997. This
trilateral exercise conducted bv Benin, Togo and
France rvith the participation of Burkina-Faso,
rvas held on the terntory of Benin and Togo. The
main theme of the exercise lvas to deploy a mul-
tinatronal force under the aegrs of the United
Nations in order to secure a humarutarian zone
for refugees. More than 4 000 troops partrcr-
pated, while units from land, sea and air also
took part in the exercise.
92. France considers such exercises, lvhich are
similar to Petersberg missions, as possrble prep-
aration for the establishment of multrnatronal
African intervention forces for humanitarian and
peacekeeping operations
WI lltEU and the crisis in Albania
93. When the srtuatron in Albania rapidly
deteriorated at the end of February and the
begrnning of March 1997, it seemed as rf the
Councrl of WEU u'as rntent upon ignoring what
was happenlng, even though two full members of
WEU are ncrghbours of Albama. It was left to
the OSCE to act through its special envo1,, Franz
Vranitzky Even after the latter had spoken out
m favour of sending a military stabilisation force
of 4 000 troops and police offrcers to the region,
reactions were lukewarm.
94. The Assembly of WEU, meeting rn Athens
on 13 March 1997, adopted a Recommendatron.
No. 609, in which it stressed Europe's respon-
srbilrtl' for the maintenance of peace and secuntv
throughout the continent. It endorscd the declar-
ations and efforts of the EU, OSCE and Council
of Europe to achreve a peaccful reconcihation in
Albania but, at the same time, recalled that it was
WEU's role, if the situation so required, to
implement the mrlrtary aspects of the common
foreign and sccuntl' policy of the EU. It recom-
mended that the Councrl.
"1. Morutor ver1, closell' the development
of the situatron rn Albania in order to be
prepared to act ifrequested to do so,
2. Instruct the WEU Satellite Centre in
Torrej6n to provide ongoing assessments
of the situation in Albania for use by both
the Council and the Planning Cell and
provide it rvith the means to accelerate its
working procedures;
3. Ask the Planning Cell to draw up
contingencv plans for possible operatrons
in Albanra covenng the full range of
Petersberg operations from humanitanan
and rescue tasks to peacekeeping tasks and
peacemakmg, mcludmg control over the
restrtutron of arms and munitions."
95 The Forergn Minrsters of the European
Union, meeting rn Apeldoorn on 15 March
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decided to send a hrgh-level missron to Trrana,
which also included representatrves from the
OSCE, the European Commrssion. Itall' and
Greece in order to examine rvith the Albanran
authorities ways m which the EU could help re-
establish security in the country'. rn particular by
sending a mrsslon of civilian and militarl, advis-
ers. At that meeting, Germany and the United
Kingdom in partrcular were said to have argued
against any militarv intervention.
96. The Italian Forergn Secretary said that the
EU rvas seeking a polrtical and diplomatic solu-
tion, not a military one. The French Foreign
Minister, Herve de Charette, also Chairman-ln-
Offrce of the WEU Council, declared on 17
March that rt was "inconceivable" that the EU
should send troops to Albania to restore order. It
was not up to European troops to confiscate
weapons, but it was possible to help the Albanian
army and police to rebuild therr forcesro.
97 At its meeting on 14 March 1997, the
WEU Permanent Councrl adopted the followrng
statement:
"The WEU viervs the situatron in Albanra
with great concern. It expresses lts con-
cern at the violent troubles there. The
WEU is following the situation closely. It
fully supports the rnitiatrves of interna-
tional organisations, especially the OSCE
and the EU. It calls on all parties to
rnstantly'abstarn from all recourse to vio-
lence and to establish a dialogue so that
the democratic process can resume its
course."
98. The Planning Cell was asked to monitor
and assess developments in Albania without
being tasked to do any,thing else, such as drafting
a contingency plan. A Plannrng Cell police offi-
cer participated in the mrssion of a EU advance
team which visited Albania at the end of March
in order to assess the situation.
99 At a press conference some days later,
WEU's Secretary'-General, Mr Cutilerro, de-
clared that WEU rvas "ready to act" and that it
drd not rule out "action in the future". He ven-
tured that WEU contrnued to prepare itself in
order to have the necessary capacities and to be
ready', in the future, to respond to any request
made by the European Uruon or to act upon a
toAtlanhc iy'era,s, l9 March 1997
decisron by rts members. "The Planning Cell can
move onto an operational plan very quickly". the
headquarters (national and alhed) rvere "well
catalogued", so that those in charge knou'rvhom
they should rapidly address rf need be. If the EU
and the OSCE, he added. asked us to protect
humarutarian aid in Albanla "we rvould probably
be able to do so but thrs depends on exactly lvhat
the countnes ask""
100. Meanrvhrle, a coalrtion of countrres under
Italian leadershrp had decrded to set up a multi-
national protection force for Albania. The
6 0O0-strong force with the Italian General,
Luciano Forlani, as force commander, started its
deplolment on 14 April 1997 and consisted of
troops from France, Greece, Italy and Spain as
WEU member states; Turkey as a WEU associ-
ate member, Austria and Denmark as WEU ob-
servers, and Romania as a WEU associate part-
ner.
101. Following a decision of the WEU Perma-
nent Council, the Planning Cell has now sec-
onded a liaison officer to the operational head-
quarters of Operation Alba in Rome as an ob-
seryer.
102 On 22 Apnl 1997, the WEU Council
decrded to send a fact-findrng mrssion to Albania,
in agreement wrth the Albanian authoritres and m
cooperatron wrth the multinational Protection
Force, in order to assess police capabilities in the
countr)' and to study "the practical modalities of
a possible deployment of a multinational advi-
sorl' element". The mission, headed b1, the
French Presrdency of the WEU Council, is com-
posed of a WEU Planning Cell offrcer and repre-
sentatives from Austria, Denmark, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, and the Unrted Kingdom.
The objective of the WEU missron rvas to study
arrangements for training Albanran police offr-
cers and instructors rn logistics. legal command,
communications and operatronal fields. In the
light of the report produced by this missron, the
WEU Councrl decided to deplov a multinational
advrsorv police element (MAPE)l2. A draft
mandate for the MAPE was adopted by the WEU
Permanent Council on 2 Mar' 1997.
1l Atlanfic l\rews,28 March 1997.
t2Atlanttc lVews,26 Aprrl 1997.
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